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HUNTING ELEPHANTS IN ASIA: ARE
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES THE ANSWER
FOR INDEPENDENTS?*
Dennis Stickley-
I. INTRODUCTION
The track record of experienced, well-financed independent oil com-
panies demonstrates that this segment of the energy and production
(E&P) industry has been responsible for discovering more oil in North
America than the integrated majors.' Independents have an opportunity
to repeat this performance in the Asia-Pacific crescent. Although the
technological and financial requirements will be familiar, the institutional
and cultural settings are vastly different. Moreover, rather than pursuing
exploration solely for the purpose of export, the dynamic and expanding
economies of the "Tigers of Asia" are becoming increasingly reliant on
oil and gas for domestic consumption.2 This reliance is illustrated by
Indonesia's forecasts that it will need to import crude oil and petroleum
products by the end of the century.3 Overall, the outlook is for continu-
ally increasing activity, not only among traditional producing countries,
but also among newcomers such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam.4
* The term 'elephant' refers to a discovery with the potential to produce more than 100
million barrels ofoil which is sometimes referred to as a "giant" field. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE
499 (1991).
t B.S., M.S., J.D., University of Wyoming, LL.M., University of Utah. General Manager
External Relations, Fletcher Challenge Petroleum Ltd., Wellington, New Zealand. The author
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. J.A.K. Humphrey, Mr. Gail Brooks, and Mr. Alan
Bewley of Fletcher Challenge Petroleum Asia Ltd.
1. William G. Sumners, Jr., The Small Oil Company Experience, INT'L ENERGY L. 355, 357
(1982).
2. This is a reference to the nine economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and the People's Republic of China whose collective
annual increase in GDP has averaged more than 7% for the last five years. See INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 161 (1991).
3. See Indonesia's Oil Sector: Overview and Outlook, PETROMIN, Oct. 1990, at 22, 26.
4. J. Aung Khin, Far East: It's Still One of the World's Hot Spots, WORLD OIL, Aug. 1990, at
114.
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Southeast Asian countries are eager to guarantee the security of for-
eign investment. Most countries have enacted legislation in order to give
assurances of safety from political risk.5 For example, the Philippine
Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the Foreign In-
vestments Act which liberalized the entry of foreign investment into that
country.6
While other petroleum regions of the world are either drawing upon
established production bases or seeking to increase incremental produc-
tion through enhanced recovery methods, Asia poses opportunities for
new exploration as it still possesses large unexplored on-shore and
marine sedimentary basins with the potential for major discoveries. The
extent of this region is shown in Figure 1. Furthermore, exploration of
these areas is moving ahead with the development of new business rela-
tionships between Asian governments and various outsiders. Previously,
all on-shore operations in the People's Republic of China were the sole
responsibility of the China National Petroleum Corp.' In 1990, China
granted the first on-shore contract to a joint venture headed by Fletcher
Challenge Petroleum.' The Republic of Vietnam has recently begun to
encourage foreign led exploration offshore near the Mekong Delta in an
area that has always been seen as holding high potential for prospectiv-
ity.9 Moreover, in 1989, after ten years of negotiations, Australia and
Indonesia finally reached an agreement on the terms for the exploration
and development of the Timor Gap area.' 0 The figures on the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and non-ASEAN nations for
drilling activities and petroleum production are depicted in Tables 1 and
5. See, eg., Karen R_ Dickinson, Is China's 'Open Door' Closing?-The Current Political and
Economic Atmosphere in the People's Republic of China and Its Effect Upon Foreign Investment, 25
ApIz. Arr'y, April 1989, at 29, 32. See generally OFFICE OF THE STATE COMMITrEE FOR CO-
OPERATION AND INVESTMENT FOR THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, LEGAL WRITINGS ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN VIETNAM (1990) (english translation).
6. See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 100883 (Phil. Dec. 2, 1991).
7. Exploratory Emphasis Shifts to the West; Interview with Wang Tao, President, China Na-
tional Petroleum Corp., WORLD OIL, January 1990, at 26.
8. Contracts were signed between China National Oil Development and Santa Fe Energy Re-
sources of China, Inc. and Petrocorp Exploration China Limited and Nomeco China Inc. for petro-
leum exploration, development and production in the Dongting Basin of Hunan Province.
9. Khin, supra note 4, at 125.
10. Henry Burmester, The Timor Gap Treaty, 1990 ANN. CONF. AuSTL. MINING & PETRO-
LEuM LAW ASS'N, Paper No. 2, at 1. Under the treaty, the Timor Gap area has been divided into
three zones covering 61,000 square kilometers of a potentially hydrocarbon rich area. Id. In Zone
A, Australia and Indonesia will share equally in the proceeds from petroleum production. In Zone
B, closest to Australia, gross-resource rent tax on oil production will be shared between Australia
and Indonesia at the ratio of 90%/10% in favor of Australia. In Zone C, closest to Indonesia, an
equivalent arrangement will apply. The treaty is valid for 40 years, with a possible 20 year exten-
sion. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 27:607
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2 respectively. At latest count, there were approximately forty-five for-
eign oil companies operating within the region."
Even in light of these encouraging factors, independent oil compa-
nies must confront a variety of issues when contemplating whether to
become active in the Asia-Pacific region. The development of synergistic
relationships with similarly situated regional exploration companies
could help participants go beyond the conventional joint venture ap-
proach by combining strength-with-strength in what management gurus
term strategic alliances. 12
II. KNOWING THE TERRITORY
Before advancing the virtues of a strategic alliance between North
American companies and experienced regional explorers, it would be
helpful to consider some of the pitfalls of Asian exploration which await
the uninitiated. As the professor says in the Music Man, "you've gotta
know the territory."
A. Geologic Data
As a general matter, geologic data has been regarded as proprietary
to the national oil company or government energy ministry of the host
country. This view has prevailed regardless of the fact that information
was obtained through the efforts and expenditures of private operations.
Perhaps this attitude is explained, in part, by the fact that under the typi-
cal production sharing or service contract, the foreign oil company is
basically performing a service for the host government.1 3 As the pro-
vider of a service, the foreign oil company does not acquire any owner-
ship interest in the resource. The production share taken by the private
operator constitutes payment for contract performance.
Thus, private operators in many countries cannot legitimately trade
in geologic data because all requests for this information must be chan-
neled through the government. For example, Malaysia continues to re-
gard geologic information to be in the nature of a state security secret.
However, recently in Indonesia, Pertamina began to permit geologic data
11. Khin, supra note 4, at 115.
12. For a general discussion of the increasing importance of strategic alliances in international
business, see F. CONTRACTOR & PETER LORANGE, COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS (1988); KATHRYN R. HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT VENTURES (1985).
13. See Alfred J. Boulos, Negotiating an E&P Agreement: Are There Mutuality of Interests with
Host Governments from an Oil Company Perspective?, 8 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REV. 414, 415
(1990).
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to be purchased by parties other than those who hold production sharing
contracts for the area of interest.1 4 It is not uncommon in some Asian
countries, as part of the concession contract process, to require the pri-
vate operator to pay a data acquisition fee as part of the stipulated finan-
cial contribution.
B. Government Participation
Since the 1960s, participation by host governments in all phases of
exploration and production has been the hallmark of Asian exploration.
Typically, government participation has taken the form of either produc-
tion sharing or service contracts between the government's national oil
company and private operators.15 Such arrangements were initially
shunned by the multinationals.16 This shunning opened the opportunity
for independents to compete for exploration agreements and to cooperate
with national oil companies. The general pattern has been for smaller
companies to enter through farm-ins in search of a market position while
the multinationals competed strategically for acreage, projects, and
prime contracts.
Another form of government participation includes the ministry or
national oil company as a joint venture participant. Generally speaking,
the government's interest is carried by the other participants during the
exploration phase. Upon completion of a commercial discovery, the gov-
ernment can then elect to fund its portion of development costs and take
up full rights to its share of production.1 7 Chinese contracts go so far as
to provide that the state corporation may, at an appropriate time after
commencement of commercial production, take over all of the produc-
tion operations. 8
C. Philosophy of Production Sharing Contracts
Because government participation typically takes the form of pro-
duction sharing contracts, an understanding of this concept is a neces-
sary prerequisite. The agreement considered the standard by many is the
production sharing contract administered by Pertamina, the Indonesian
14. See Indonesia on the Move, PETROMIN, Oct. 1991, at 12, 18.
15. See generally Ernest E. Smith, Typical World Petroleum Arrangements, 1990 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. LAW FOUND. Paper No. 9.
16. Sumners, supra note 1, at 357.
17. GORDON H. BARROWS, WORLDWIDE CONCESSION CONTRACTS AND PETROLEUM LEGIs-
LATION 32-33 (1983).
18. Tang Changxu, The Policy and Practice on China's Offshore Petroleum Exploitation in Co-
operation with Foreign Enterprises, INT'L ENERGY L. 783, 791 (1984).
[Vol. 27:607
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national oil company. 9 The Indonesian approach is often summarized
simply as an 85%/15% split between Pertamina and the contractor, re-
spectively. However, the contract is neither as simple nor as onerous as
the figures might indicate.
The commerciality requirement is an important feature of the
Pertamina contract. The requirement essentially places the burden of
proof regarding the existence of commercial quantities upon the contrac-
tor in order for the contractor to receive permission to develop a given
field. There are no royalties paid under the Indonesian regime. How-
ever, many other countries that have tracked the fiscal terms of the Indo-
nesian model have adopted royalties that typically range from about 8 to
12.5%.20
One of the most important features of a production sharing contract
is the cost recovery mechanism which allows the contractor to recoup
the costs of exploration, development, and operations out of gross reve-
nue. The typical production sharing contract does not limit the level of
expenditures the contractor may claim for cost recovery. The only re-
quirement is that tangible costs must be depreciated. However, early
Pertamina contracts from the late 1960s to 1978 did have an annual limit
of 40% on cost recovery. The contracts of most of the Asian countries
have a cost recovery limit of 40 to 60% of annual gross revenues; and,
like Pertamina's, they allow unrecouped costs to be carried forward and
recovered in succeeding years. 21
The production revenues remaining after cost recovery are subjected
to a split as "profit oil" before tax. For example, under the Pertamina
approach the split is calculated as follows:
Oil Gas
Pertamina 65.9% 68%
Contractor 34.1% 32%
In an effort to stimulate exploration, the after-tax profit oil split for con-
tracts signed after 1988 may range between 75%/25% and 90%/10% in
19. See John C. Kinna, Recent Trends in Petroleum Regimes, INT'L ENERGY L. 479, 485
(1982). In 1990, Pertamina signed 19 contracts with work program commitments valued at $900
million. Indonesia, supra note 14, at 18.
20. See BARROWS, supra note 17, at 6.
21. KEITH W. BLINN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITA-
TION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS 75 (1986).
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favor of the government. The exact ratio depends upon certain condi-
tions such as tertiary recovery, production levels, frontier areas, etc. The
split for new contracts in conventional areas is 80%/20% in favor of
Pertamina on an after-tax basis.
Many contracts worldwide have instituted a sliding scale for profit
oil splits, as well as the limit on cost recovery. Recently, Pertamina pro-
posed a sliding scale profit oil split for new frontier contract areas. The
after-tax split is on the order of:
Pertamina : Contractor Production Rates (bbl/da)
80%: 20% Up to 50,000
85% : 15% 50,000-150,000
90% :10% Over 150,00022
D. Domestic Purchase Requirements and Prices
A cornerstone of the production sharing concept has been recogni-
tion that the contractor's share of production can be exported and pro-
ceeds of the sale retained abroad.23 However, some Asian agreements
make provisions for "prohibited destinations" as notified by the host
government.
Under the terms of some Asian production sharing agreements, the
private operator is required to sell all or a portion of production to state-
owned enterprises. For example, in Thailand, first priority for the
purchase of crude is granted to the Thai Government.24 In addition, the
price paid is to reflect $.15 U.S. per barrel discount for oil of comparable
API quality. Indonesia has an official government selling price for oil
marketed domestically. This is a subsidized price that is used for cost
recovery, tax calculations, and transactions between the contractor and
the government. However, these subsidies are being reduced through a
process of market deregulation.
E. Bonuses
Two kinds of bonuses are encountered in Asian production sharing
agreements. It is not unusual for signature bonuses to be paid both at
finalization of negotiations and upon contract execution. Depending
upon the market and the attitude of the host government, these bonuses
22. See BARROWS, supra note 17, at 13.
23. See Smith, supra note 15, at 36.
24. BARROWS, supra note 17, at 260.
[Vol. 27:607
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can range from one to ten million dollars. Additionally, bonuses are paid
when production from a given contract area reaches specified thresholds
that are generally stated in 1,000 barrel multiples. Payments can be trig-
gered by so-called "first commercial production" starting at several mil-
lion dollars and becoming larger as production plateaus exceed 50,000 to
100,000 barrels per day.
F. Drilling Obligations
A standard feature, if not the driving force, of production sharing
contracts is the obligation for the contractor to spend a stipulated mini-
mum amount on seismic acquisition and exploration drilling under an
approved work program. This obligation is usually stated in terms of so
many kilometers of seismic and a set number of exploratory wells, which
are estimated to amount to a total expenditure of "X' millions of dollars.
Any company intending to undertake exploration under these petroleum
regimes must bear in mind that the host governments essentially consider
these arrangements to be foreign investment agreements. As such, they
are intended to operate to bring foreign exchange into their economies,
which explains the rationale for host governments to speak in terms of
the "investment value" of the production sharing contracts signed with
foreign oil companies.
Another fairly standard feature is that all equipment purchased by
the contractor for purposes of carrying out the work program will, at
some point in time, become the property of the government oil com-
pany. 25 Title to the equipment will either transfer when it is landed in
the country or, in any event, after the contractor has been permitted to
recover the cost under the production sharing agreement. Many foreign
oil companies now arrange to lease most of the equipment that is used on
Asian projects.
G. Ringed-Fenced Expenditures
Unlike the U.S. tax code, most Asian petroleum tax regimes do not
permit cost recovery deductions for drilling and development expenses to
be applied outside of the individual contract area where the expenditures
are made. 6 The inability to consolidate costs can be a disincentive for
25. BLINN ET AL., supra note 21, at 166.
26. See generally COOPERS & LYBRAND, NATIONAL TAX SERVICES, MINING TAXATION: A
GLOBAL SURVEY (Dennis J. McCarthy ed., 1991). See also Boulos, supra note 13, at 421-22.
1992]
7
Stickley: Hunting Elephants in Asia: Are Strategic Alliances the Answer for
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1991
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
explorers to take up multiple concessions since dry hole costs cannot be
transferred to contract areas where efforts have been successful.
H. Management and Training Obligations
The transfer of operational skills and technology figures promi-
nently among the benefits that host governments obtain from production
sharing or service contracts. Even when the technology being applied is
not proprietary to the contractor, there is often a duty for the contractor
to undertake reasonable efforts to obtain permission for the transfer of
processes that are restricted by patent or license agreements.27
Preferences for use of local labor, goods, and services are also stated
as contract conditions. Usually, employment obligations are conditional
upon hiring competent and qualified or trainable nationals. An exper-
ienced operator will stipulate that the contract also provide local serv-
ices, such as engineering, must be competitive in terms of technical
proficiency, cost, and timing of delivery.
I. Dual Language Agreements
It is not unusual for the production sharing agreement to be written
in both English and the language of the host government. However, it is
generally understood and accepted, that as an international investment
document, English will either control interpretation of the contract, or at
least stand on equal footing with the official language of the host coun-
try.28 In Indonesia, English is the exclusive language of the production
sharing contract. This is in contrast to the situation in Thailand where
the English version has no standing. There is a strong preference for
service contracts and administrative documents to be dual language.
Pertamina goes even further and directs contractors to expressly provide
that the Indonesian language will control the interpretation of those op-
erational and commercial obligations which are to be performed within
the country.
J. Dispute Resolution
The substantive law for interpretation of the contract as well as the
forum for resolving contractual disputes are perennial topics among legal
27. See MICHAEL BLACKENEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DE-
VELOPING CoUNTRIEs 89 (1989).
28. See BARROWS, supra note 17, at 1-2.
[Vol. 27:607
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advisors to the international oil industry.2 9 The generally accepted rule
is that the national law of the host country will apply to the production
sharing contract, joint venture operating agreement, and service con-
tracts. 30 In all practicality, disagreements with the host government or
national oil company are best resolved through conciliation rather than
litigation or arbitration. There are two key objectives to be accomplished
in this regard.
The first task is for the negotiator to strike a balance between the
legal precedents of the host country and the application of legal princi-
ples which are generally observed in the international petroleum indus-
try. This is accomplished by providing in the contract, that for questions
of interpretation where there is no applicable local law, the law generally
prevailing in the international petroleum industry will be observed.
The second objective is to secure a neutral forum for dispute resolu-
tion. Currently, ninety-four nations have ratified the International Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes employing the World
Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes as
the adjudicative tribunal. 31 Despite this fact, it appears that most Asian
countries still prefer to have the arbitration of disputes conducted ac-
cording to the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitra-
tion.32 Other countries, such as Indonesia, have developed their own
codes of arbitration and require that this procedure be used exclusively
for contracts performed in those countries.33
A final attempt is usually made to deal with the possible retroactive
application of new legislation. Contract terms often provide for the par-
ties to engage in consultation for potential revisions and adjustments in
the relevant provisions of the contract in order to permit the private op-
erator to maintain the economic benefits intended by the agreement.
K. Foreign Exchange Limits on Local Partners
The scarcity of U.S. dollars in some Asian economies has recently
made it difficult for local participants to meet their funding obligations
29. Stephen Hancock & Lawrence Collins, Dispute Resolution in International Investment
Agreements, 12 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N Rvv. 399 (1990); BLINN ET AL., supra note 21, at 315.
30. See Arvid Frihagen, Petroleum Joint Operating Agreements--Legal Structure and Basic Is-
sues in an International Perspective, BERGEN UNIVERSITY, 1985 INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC LAW 12, 14.
31. See Aron Broches, ICISD: A Two-Tier System?, 1991 I.B.A. lTm BIENNIAL CONF.
32. See Stephen R. Bond, ICC Arbitration in the Asia/Pacific Region, 1991 I.B.A. 10TH BIEN-
NIAL CONF.
33. See INDONESIAN NATIONAL BOARD OF ARBITRATION, RULES OF PROCEDURE (commonly
known as "Code BANI").
1992]
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under approved drilling programs. The delay or outright failure to meet
cash call obligations triggers the default provisions common to joint ven-
ture operating agreements. 34 In the event that strict performance is de-
manded, the forced transfer of the defaulting participant's proportionate
interest might have serious legal and political ramifications. However,
legally, most courts are very reluctant to sanction the forfeiture of the
entire interest for failure to meet a single cash call, particularly if there
are events that are arguably beyond the control of the defaulting party.
Also, business, political, and cultural relations with the host government
and local supporters can be injured by the termination of participation
rights held by domestic companies.
Joint venture agreements need to provide some contingencies for
such occasions. Options include the impoundment of local funds in a
dedicated joint venture account, or provisions for payment of some ex-
penses in a currency other than U.S. dollars.35 For example, equipment
being fabricated in Korea or Japan and support vessel services being fur-
nished from Singapore could be paid for in those currencies.
L. Equipment and Infrastructure
Extended supply and communications networks have proven to be a
source of frustration to many North American firms who have ventured
into the Asia-Pacific region. While the long term availability of supplies
and equipment is usually not a real factor, there are often delays beyond
those usually encountered for comparable programs in Canada and the
United States. Longer lead times, often one year, are required for
budgeting and scheduling. When a supplier tells you that it will take six
months to have the right valve-believe it! It is not unusual for the de-
velopment of a discovery to require the construction of gathering sys-
tems, storage tanks, terminals, and even ports. Expect to have to build
these facilities from grass roots, often under appalling conditions. Obvi-
ously, this kind of expense can take a terrible toll on discounted cash-
flow rates of return.
34. See BLINN ET AL., supra note 21, at 200-01.
35. While the Model Form International Operating Agreement of 1990 requires that work Pro-
gram Budgets and Authorization for Expenditures be stated in terms of U.S. dollars, it does not
require that cash calls must be met only in U.S. currency. See, eg., Andrew B. Derman, Interna-
tional Oil and Gas Joint Venture 4 Discussion with Associated Form Agreement& International Re-
sources Law: A Blueprint for Mineral Development, 1991 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. Paper No.
20, at 92-93.
[Vol. 27:607
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III. DEVELOPING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
A. Joint Ventures
Strategic alliances are well accepted for formulating and implement-
ing international business strategies. These cooperative arrangements be-
tween firms can be structured in a variety of ways.36 The joint venture
has always been a unique form of business organization for bringing to-
gether capital and technical talent. Oil companies have traditionally par-
ticipated in joint ventures for the purpose of reducing their exposure
from the financial risk associated with unsuccessful exploration.3"
The joint venture is particularly suited to petroleum development
activities for several reasons. Petroleum exploration and development in-
volve substantial sums of capital, possess a high risk factor, are inevitably
of a long term nature, and are often one-of-a-kind associations. Conse-
quently, the structure of any agreement must be tailored to have the flexi-
bility to adapt to market forces peculiar to the petroleum industry. In
addition, because each project will have its own complex technical, finan-
cial, taxation, legal, social, and political considerations, the parties must
be free to negotiate to take these factors into account. For these and
other reasons, traditional forms of business organizations are not particu-
larly well suited to deal with matters encountered by modem, large scale
mining or petroleum projects when compared with joint ventures.
According to Michael Porter's "5 Forces Model," joint ventures
proliferate in response to the following:
(1) The relative 'strength' of buyers or customers.
(2) The relative 'strength' of sellers of suppliers of goods or labor.
(3) Relative ease of market entry by potential new competitors.
(4) The potential availability of 'substitutes'.
(5) Rivalry between competing firms.38
In the 1990s, joint venture relationships are increasingly formed in
response to a variety of influences, principally those which stress size,
financial depth, and control of technology.39 The benefits of a strategic
36. The terms of strategic alliances are grouped into eight general categories: acquisitions, eq-
uity participation, joint venture, project-based consortium, joint development, distributor, agent, and
franchise. Peter Lorange & Johan Roos, Analytical Steps in the Formation of Strategic Alliances, 4 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 60, 62 (1991).
37. See Derman, supra note 35.
38. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUS-
TRIES AND COMPETITORS 4, fig. 1.1 (1980).
39. See generally Michael P. Lyons, Joint Ventures as Strategic Choice-A Literature Review, 24
LONG RANGE PLANNING 130 (1991).
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alliance result from its scale, scope, and complementarity. 40 These stra-
tegic forces are particularly relevant for Asia-Pacific petroleum
exploration.
A contemporary joint venture is essentially an alliance of two or
more firms. Therefore, it is critical that the participants enter into this
form of collaboration with compatible goals and objectives. This in-
volves not only mutual confidence between the parties, but an "asymme-
try" between the positions of the participants so that a stronger more
viable entity is formed when they join together.4 1
Looking at this topic in the context of Asian exploration, the opti-
mum match-up would be between firms that have a strong land position
and understanding of regional geology and political conditions on the
one hand, and North American independents that are adequately capital-
ized and have experienced personnel skilled in production activities on
the other hand. Other than financing, which is never to be underesti-
mated, perhaps the greatest experiential contribution a North American
company new to Asia can make is in the area of field operations and
oversight of development activities. This is particularly true if the com-
pany has gained experience in offshore operations in Texas, Louisiana, or
the North Sea. Such an alliance would emphasize the complimentary
nature of the upstream strength of the experienced Asian explorer and
the downstream strength of the U.S. or Canadian production company.42
B. The Growing Impact of Pr'vatization
Notwithstanding what has traditionally been a high degree of gov-
ernment involvement in the petroleum industry due both to its strategic
economic importance and the manifestation of national sovereignty,
40. Lorange & Roos, supra note 36, at 66.
41. Strategic alliances are successful where strengths are combined according to "value chains"
that combine one firm's upstream strength with another company's downstream strength resulting in
complementarity, combinations of upstream strength in research or exploration results in scale ad-
vantages for cost savings or investment sharing; combinations which stress downstream strength are
oriented at advantages from increased scope. Id. at 65. For a description of the concept of value
chains, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 19-24 (1986).
42. For my company, Indonesia offers interesting possibilities as some of our concessions are
adjacent to large producing fields. However, it is our involvement in the high risk exploration, but
potentially high pay-off area of Asia, which is attracting considerable attention from industry ex-
perts. Fletcher Challenge Petroleum Ltd. now has concessions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thai-
land, China, and possibly soon in offshore Vietnam. It has taken our company several years to
become a recognized name in Asian exploration.
[Vol. 27:607
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countries around the world (including Asia) are moving toward eco-
nomic liberalization and privatization of this industry.43 Costs of financ-
ing public debt has made it prudent, if not essential public policy, to
transfer many public enterprises to the private sector.
The Asian Tigers, in contrast to most Latin American countries and
Eastern Europe, already possess formidable economies. But despite, or
perhaps because of this, many of them have extensive privatization pro-
grams. Malaysia and Singapore have already floated a number of enter-
prises on local stock exchanges with happy results for investors. Taiwan
has recently passed privatization legislation which is expected to give im-
petus to twenty-one companies which are listed for divestment, while the
Philippines appear to be moving forward at last with the sale of some of
its more important assets after prolonged legal problems. While the coup
in Thailand appears to have interrupted progress there, the stock market
revival may reignite divestment plans in Korea. Additionally, a major
program of privatization was launched in Pakistan with the goal of sell-
ing 115 governmentally owned industrial companies and four banks
before June 1992. 44
In the field of oil and gas exploration and production, there have
been some notable sales.45 In Australia, the state of Victoria is finalizing
plans for the sale of the E&P group that is part of Gas and Fuel Corpora-
tion N.L. Indonesia has made a halting start and is now in the process of
market deregulation and decentralization, with fuel prices approaching
market levels.46 Funding cutbacks for the planned refinery complex
EXOR 3, in Indonesia, could provide more momentum towards priva-
tization of all or part of the oil industry there.
Increasingly, governments are deciding that as a matter of policy,
the state should no longer be involved directly in the production of goods
or the provision of services. This change in policy will create even more
opportunity for the creation of strategic alliances with established in-
dependent petroleum companies for the purposes of entry into down-
stream processing and refining activities.47
43. Cf. Rodney Lord, Privatisation-The Boom Goes On, PRIVATISATION INT'L (1991) (com-
menting on privatization generally).
44. Giulio Frazinetti, The World's Fastest State Sell-off, ASIA MONEY, July/Aug. 1991, at 23.
45. My own company came into being as the result of the privatization of the former state
owned company Petroleum Corporation of New Zealand.
46. Indonesia, supra note 3, at 26.
47. See Derek Bamber, Just a Hint of Hesitation, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Feb. 1992, at 8, 9.
Foreign borrowing constraints on Indonesia and other Asian governments could open the way for
direct investment in refining and gas processing for the first time. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Before deciding to undertake an active exploration program in the
Asia-Pacific region, companies should carefully assess the major busi-
ness, legal, political, and cultural issues which can influence commercial
development. The long term life cycle of petroleum production will
mean that an independent oil company should decide that being active in
Asia is central to its overall portfolio." Do not measure Asian produc-
tion arrangements strictly by North American standards. First time en-
trants into this area have often become so dismayed that they beat a
hasty retreat bypassing real opportunities.
While Asian governments still have a bit of suspicion as to the mo-
tives of western oil companies (a hangover from colonial days), they rec-
ognize they desperately need the investment and technology transfer
which comes from the exploration process. Moreover, Asia is committed
to economic development through private investment.
Linking up with a company already experienced will advance the
process of acclimation and provide a much needed insight into operations
within the region. An economically sound, well-assessed joint venture
agreement between such firms is the best formula for success.
48. See Fereidun Fesharaki et al., The Asia-Pacific Petroleum Market: Critical Issues for the
1990s, 15 NAT. RESOURCES F. 140, 140-42. The authors forecast regional production to peak at 6.6
million bbl/day in 1995, declining to 6.1 million bbl/day by 2000, while excess regional refining
capacity will increase from 1.1 million bbl/day in 1990, to 2 million bbl/day in 2000. Id.
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